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Summary. Altruistic acts involve the actor donating fitness to beneficiaries at net cost to 18 
itself. In contrast, parasitic acts involve the actor extracting benefit from others at net cost to 19 
the donors.  Both behaviours may have the same direct net-cost transferral of fitness from 20 
donor to beneficiary; the key difference between parasitism and altruism is thus who drives 21 
the interaction. Identifying the evolutionary driver is not always straightforward in practice, 22 
yet it is crucial in determining the conditions necessary to sustain such fitness exchange. Here 23 
we put classical ecological competition into a novel game-theoretic framework in order to 24 
distinguish altruism from parasitism. The distinction depends on the type of interaction that 25 
beneficiaries have amongst themselves. When this is not costly, net-cost transferrals of fitness 26 
from the donor are strongly altruistic, and sustained only by indirect benefits to the donor 27 
from assortative mixing. When the interaction amongst beneficiaries is costly, however, net-28 
cost transferrals of fitness from the donor are sustainable without assortative mixing. The 29 
donor is then forced into apparent or incidental altruism driven by parasitism from the 30 
beneficiary. We consider various scenarios in which direct and indirect fitness consequences 31 
of strong altruism may have different evolutionary drivers. 32 
Key words: biofilms, cooperative trading, density dependence, hawk-dove game, prisoner’s 33 
dilemma, snowdrift game 34 
1. INTRODUCTION 35 
An act of altruism confers a fitness advantage on others, which is strong altruism if the actor 36 
incurs a net fitness cost, and otherwise weak altruism [1,2]. The conferred advantage 37 
expresses a transferral of fitness from altruist to beneficiary, although the magnitude of the 38 
altruist’s loss may differ from the magnitude of the beneficiary’s gain. A parasitic act involves 39 
a costly transferral of fitness by the donor to a beneficiary, just as in strong altruism, with the 40 
crucial difference that the actor is the beneficiary and not the donor. The role of population 41 
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structure in sustaining these net-cost transferrals of fitness depends entirely on whether the 42 
individual driving the interaction is the donor or the beneficiary. Strongly altruistic acts of 43 
fitness transferral from donor to beneficiary can only be sustained by assorting mechanisms 44 
that cause the benefits of altruism to be visited disproportionately on other altruists or its costs 45 
to be cancelled by other indirect benefits [3-6]. In particular, assortative mixing that raises the 46 
probability of interactions with kin reduces the temptation to defect from self-sacrificing or 47 
other cooperative behaviours [1,7-9]. Parasitic acts of fitness transferral in contrast depend on 48 
the relative efficiencies of parasite-attack and host-defence mechanisms, with no inherent 49 
prerequisite for assorting mechanisms. 50 
The initiator of an interaction, either as the donor in strong altruism or the beneficiary in 51 
parasitism, is readily identified in many cases. For example, worker castes in societies of 52 
eusocial insects clearly behave altruistically in renouncing their own reproductive potential 53 
for the benefit of the colony [10]. An ant clearly does not act altruistically in hosting a 54 
trematode fluke that will manipulate the ant’s behaviour to its own benefit [11]. The identity 55 
of the evolutionary driver is ambiguous in cases where the donor may gain indirectly from the 56 
interaction with a beneficiary, as in reciprocal or kin-selected altruism, while the beneficiary’s 57 
direct gain is set against a direct cost of conflict with other beneficiaries, as in competition 58 
amongst parasites for a limiting host resource. For example, a vampire bat may share its blood 59 
meal with others at net cost to its own fitness in acts of strong altruism, which can be 60 
sustained if the beneficiaries reciprocate or are kin [12]. Such indirect benefits do not exclude 61 
the possibility that parasitic manipulation by competing beneficiaries drives selection for the 62 
net-cost transferral of fitness, regardless of reciprocation or relatedness [13]. The behaviour is 63 
then what we will term either ‘apparent altruism’, if it brings no indirect benefits to the donor, 64 
or ‘incidental altruism’ if it brings indirect benefits which however have not motivated the 65 
interaction. Empirical studies of populations with structured interactions may have little 66 
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evidence with which to distinguish these alternatives, and evolutionary theory lacks a 67 
common framework for comparing the social interaction of altruism to the exploitative 68 
interaction of parasitism.  69 
Whether the donor or the beneficiary drives the net-cost transferral of fitness has major 70 
consequences for understanding the proximal causes of the evolution of altruism, because a 71 
donor-driven transferral is not stable without assortative mixing, whereas a beneficiary-driven 72 
transferral is stable even in a freely mixed population. The objectives of this paper are to 73 
demonstrate that (i) a two-strategy game-theoretic analysis can distinguish strong altruism 74 
from parasitism only by reference to the absolute values of payoffs; (ii) the beneficiary may 75 
drive selection for the net-cost transferral of fitness in parasitism, even if the donor drives 76 
selection for the assortative mixing that sustains strong altruism. 77 
We construct a formal game theoretic framework to set the evolution of cooperation in a 78 
broader ecological context capable of distinguishing altruism from parasitism. Reformulation 79 
of standard models from ecology within game theory shows that costly interactions amongst 80 
beneficiaries make their interactions with the donor exploitative, and consequently sustainable 81 
with or without assortative mixing of players. A net-cost transferral of fitness from donor to 82 
beneficiary may be driven by parasitic manipulation, regardless of whether the donor achieves 83 
indirect fitness gains from assortative mixing. This is an important clarification to current 84 
understanding of strong altruism, which assumes that the evolution of its net-cost transferrals 85 
of fitness is driven by the indirect fitness benefits to the donor resulting from assortative 86 
mixing [1,3-7]. Competition amongst kin is then predicted to reduce selection for altruistic 87 
behaviour [8,14-17]. Our game-theoretic framework for parasitism reveals how mutual 88 
competition between parasitic beneficiaries can create selection for altruistic donors. 89 
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2. GAME-THEORETIC FRAMEWORK FOR TWO STRATEGIES 90 
The problem of how traits for strong altruism can be favoured by natural selection is 91 
embodied in a two-strategy game between two players. Each player is allowed to choose 92 
between a strategy of social cooperation and a strategy of selfish defection. It then receives a 93 
payoff that depends on its own and the other’s strategy, as shown in table 1. Mutual 94 
cooperation is not a stable strategy when its R (‘Reward’) payoff to each Cooperator is less 95 
than the T (‘Temptation’) payoff to a Defector for unilateral defection. Moreover, unilateral 96 
cooperation is not a winning strategy when its S (‘Sucker’) payoff to the Cooperator is less 97 
than the P (‘Penalty’) payoff to each Defector for mutual defection. This is the Prisoner’s 98 
Dilemma (PD). Players of the PD find that unilateral defection against a Cooperator pays 99 
better than mutual cooperation, and mutual defection pays better than unilateral cooperation. 100 
The game is a social dilemma if the payoffs create a tension between individual welfare and 101 
collective welfare given by the payoff sum for both players [18]. It is a useful analogy for 102 
social evolution theory when the same-strategy payoffs R and P take the form of fitness 103 
increments, and cross-strategy payoffs T and S can involve either a decrement or an increment 104 
to fitness. For example, given a cooperative behaviour that confers fitness benefit b at net cost 105 
c, a game may have payoffs T = b, S = -c, R = b – c, P = 0 [19,20]. The PD then represents the 106 
problem that strong altruism, with T > 0 > S, is not a stable outcome amongst freely 107 
interacting players. Any number of other relationships are possible between the fitness 108 
payoffs T, S (or b, c) and R, P, depending on the scenario [20-26]. 109 
In order to bring exploitative interactions into game theory for two strategies, we 110 
distinguish three different categories of games, according to whether the same-strategy 111 
payoffs R and P are (i) both non-negative, or (ii) R is positive and P is negative, or (iii) both 112 
are non-positive. All previous applications of two-strategy games to evolution have assumed a 113 
non-negative Reward payoff. Whereas social evolution theory conventionally takes a non-114 
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negative Penalty payoff [19-22], evolutionarily stable conflict can take positive Reward and 115 
negative Penalty (e.g., in Hawk-Dove or Hawk-Mouse variants on Defector-Cooperator 116 
games [23,24]. A zero Reward and negative Penalty can apply to games of selection for the 117 
same trait (‘kind selection’) encompassing antigreenbeard traits [25,26]. Here we show that a 118 
negative Reward and Penalty are appropriate to games involving competitive exploitation 119 
amongst individuals. Our analysis of games across all three categories yields the complete set 120 
of net-cost fitness transferrals from donor to beneficiary in altruistic and/or parasitic (or 121 
predatory) interactions, regardless of how the magnitude of the donor’s loss converts to the 122 
beneficiary’s gain. 123 
We measure payoffs in the conventional way, as the change in fitness to the actor 124 
resulting from the interaction with the recipient [2]. Payoffs are thereby calibrated against the 125 
unavailable option of no interaction, corresponding to zero change [24]. We apply this 126 
calibration to symmetric games, in which only four payoffs are possible from pairwise 127 
interactions amongst two types of player. We enumerate all outcomes for these games at three 128 
scales: (i) two strategies for two players (‘strategic players’), (ii) two phenotypes in a single 129 
population (‘replicator dynamics’), and (iii) two genetically isolated populations (‘ecological 130 
dynamics’). 131 
3. TWO-PLAYER DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL AND EXPLOITATIVE GAMES 132 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is one of four canonical games between a Cooperator and a Defector 133 
that describe the complete 4-dimensional parameter space of payoffs. That is, each of these 134 
games is defined by the relative values of T, R, S and P in the table-1 payoff matrix, from 135 
which game theory determines the winning strategy (or equilibrium strategies). Figure 1(a) 136 
shows thresholds of the payoff matrix for the four canonical games of Prisoner’s Dilemma 137 
(PD), Snow-Drift (SD, including evolutionarily stable Hawk-Dove or Hawk-Mouse games), 138 
Harmony Game (HG), and Stag Hunt (SH). The coloured domains in figure 1(b) show the 139 
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game outcomes. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is won by the Defector to the exclusion of the 140 
Cooperator; the Snow-Drift game sustains both Defector and Cooperator (which may take the 141 
roles respectively of Hawk and Dove/Mouse); the Harmony Game is won by the Cooperator 142 
to the exclusion of the Defector; the Stag Hunt game has bi-stability [27]. 143 
Comparisons between games are facilitated by reducing the dimensionality, for example 144 
by normalizing the rankings against a 1-unit Reward and zero Penalty [28,29]. In order to 145 
facilitate the mapping of social with exploitation games, we introduce a more flexible 146 
normalization that fixes the Reward at a constant R units and the Penalty at a lower value of P 147 
= ±1/R. The condition R > P encompasses three categories of games, illustrated in figures 148 
2(a)-(c). These are: (a) a positive Penalty that is less beneficial than a positive Reward (shown 149 
with R > 1, P = 1/R); (b) a negative Penalty and positive Reward (P = -1/R); (c) a Penalty that 150 
is more costly than a negative Reward (0 > R > -1, P = 1/R). These alternatives preserve the 151 
integrity of payoff rankings that define each game, such that the winning strategy remains 152 
unchanged by the sign of the Reward and Penalty (e.g., cooperation never wins in the 153 
Prisoner’s Dilemma). For all three categories, their four games have unconfined domains, 154 
extending indefinitely beyond the axes. Social dilemmas arise only below the angled pink 155 
lines in figure 2, where collective welfare pays better than individual welfare (2R > T + S), 156 
and the benefits of cooperation conflict with those of defection (greed prevails with T > R or 157 
fear prevails with P > S), always assuming R > P [18]. The social dilemma ignores any 158 
specifics about who initiates interactions, or their mechanisms or functions. 159 
Assigning a positive value to R puts the origin of the Temptation-Sucker plane within the 160 
SH domain when P ≥ 0 (figure 2(a) for P = 1/R). The quartiles surrounding the origin 161 
describe alternative payoffs for the Cooperator in terms of the four modes of social behaviour 162 
in the Hamiltonian classification [2,30,31]: +/+ mutual benefit, +/– strong altruism (stippled), 163 
–/– spite, or –/+ selfishness. The Cooperator in the mutual-benefit quartile is weakly altruistic 164 
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across the segment T > S > 0, defined by its altruistic transferral of fitness to the Defector (T > 165 
S) combined with its net fitness gain (S > 0) distinguishing it from strong altruism. In contrast, 166 
the Cooperator in the strong-altruism quartile is strongly altruistic throughout, defined by T > 167 
0 > S, with the negative S expressing its net fitness loss relative to non-interaction. The 168 
Cooperator strategy is not a stable outcome in the strong-altruism quartile. Selfishness is 169 
stable in the Defector-only domain of PD, and mutual benefit is stable throughout the 170 
coexistence domain of SD. 171 
Given the possibility of games with a negative P, the origin of the Temptation-Sucker 172 
plane is not constrained to the SH domain. In fact, the only domain from which it is excluded 173 
is PD, because that would require P > 0 > R. Figure 2(b) shows the origin in HG for games 174 
having same-strategy interactions that are beneficial for the Cooperator but costly for the 175 
Defector (R > 0 > P). The immediate consequence of moving the origin out of SH is that the 176 
+/– interaction is no longer confined to the Defector-only outcome of PD. It becomes an 177 
alternative to the +/+ interaction as a coexistence outcome within SD (stippled green sector), 178 
and is sustained in the Cooperator-only HG (stippled blue sector). 179 
Figure 2(c) shows the origin in the SD domain for games between two strategies that both 180 
have negative same-strategy payoffs. The Cooperator strategy in this scenario may be 181 
cooperative only in the relative sense of its same-strategy interaction (Cooperator-Cooperator) 182 
being less costly than the Defector’s same-strategy interaction (Defector-Defector). Now all 183 
four types of interaction behaviour have coexistence outcomes in SD.  184 
A Defector strategy with negative P gives coexistence outcomes the character of Hawk-185 
Dove or Hawk-Mouse conflicts [24]. The +/– interaction in the SD domains of figures 2(b)-186 
(c) more reasonably describe a manipulator-victim or parasite-host relationship than a selfish-187 
altruist relationship of the sort that applies to PD in figure 2(a), even for the social Cooperator 188 
in figure 2(b). 189 
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For any social dilemma, and regardless of any normalization of same-strategy payoffs, 190 
net-cost transferrals of fitness are excluded from SD only by P ≥ 0. A net cost transferral of 191 
fitness therefore has alternative domains set by P. It arises in PD amongst players with non-192 
negative P, where it is interpreted as strong altruism and cannot be sustained without 193 
assortative mixing (e.g., kin selection). In the particular case of P = 0, and only in this case, 194 
unilateral cooperation in PD is synonymous with strong altruism. Alternatively, the net-cost 195 
transferral of fitness arises in SD amongst players that have negative P, where it is sustained 196 
in freely mixing populations as victimization by an aggressor. Game theoretic treatments of 197 
social evolution conventionally equate the cross-strategy interaction in PD with altruism 198 
[5,19,32-36]. In order to demonstrate fully the danger of assuming this equivalence, we 199 
further develop the analysis of games with negative P. The following two sections explain the 200 
net-cost transferrals of fitness in SD in terms of replicator dynamics and ecological dynamics. 201 
4. WITHIN-POPULATION DYNAMICS OF SOCIAL AND EXPLOITATIVE GAMES 202 
Two-strategy games for two players are extended to two-strategy games for a population of 203 
players for the purposes of modelling evolutionary change by frequency-dependent selection. 204 
Here we use standard replicator dynamics to describe evolutionary games for a population of 205 
two phenotypes, in which their relative frequencies in the population determine individual 206 
fitness [37-39]. The equivalent ecological model then reveals the role of exploitative 207 
interactions in sustaining net-cost transferrals of fitness between phenotypes. 208 
Let strategies E1 and E2 have frequency-dependent expected payoffs (Ax)1 and (Ax)2 for 209 
playing Cooperator and Defector respectively, where A is the table-1 matrix of fitness 210 
payoffs, and x is the vector of fractions x1, 1 – x1 describing the relative frequencies of 211 
Cooperator and Defector. The evolutionary success of strategy Ei is expressed as the 212 
difference between its fitness and the average fitness: (Ax)i – xAx [38]. For a large 213 
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population susceptible to continuously changing frequencies, this difference determines the 214 
per capita rate of change i ix x over time t. The replicator equation for each of two strategies 215 
is then 216 
 i i ix x        A x x A x . (4.1)   
Solving for xi in equation (4.1) at ix = 0 gives the evolutionarily stable frequency xi* of 217 
strategy Ei. This is 0 or 1 if P ≥ S and/or R ≥ T, and otherwise takes positive stable fractions 218 
x1* = (S – P)/(S – P + T – R) and x2* = (T – R)/(S – P + T – R) [38]. These relative frequencies 219 
equal the probabilities of playing each strategy in the two-player game [24].  220 
The two-phenotype replicator equation (4.1) is numerically equivalent to a single-221 
genotype ecological model with the Lotka-Volterra form 222 
   y y S P R T y        , (4.2)   
where y = x1/x2 and x2t defines the time-scale [38]. A Cooperator strategy can invade the 223 
genotype on condition S > P, whereupon its ratio with a Defector strategy grows logistically 224 
on condition T > R, to equilibrium y* = (S – P)/(T – R). 225 
Figures 2(a)-(c) model the categories of equilibrium outcome that apply equally to 226 
equations (4.1) and (4.2) on the T-S plane for positive and negative R and P, with P = ±1/R. 227 
Just as for two players, figures 2(b)-(c) show that a homogeneous population can sustain net-228 
cost transferrals of fitness from Cooperator to Defector phenotype provided P < 0. The 229 
stippled green sector of the T-S plane sustains this type of interaction, and in a social dilemma 230 
below the angled pink line. The transferral of fitness from Cooperator to Defector is driven by 231 
the Defector sustainably exploiting the Cooperator in homogeneously mixed interactions, so 232 
without requirement for indirect fitness benefits to the Cooperator as in strong altruism. 233 
An example illustrates the danger of assigning P ≥ 0 to a scenario that may have costly 234 
same-strategy interactions. Meat sharing amongst non-kin chimpanzees has potential 235 
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explanations in reciprocal altruism or manipulative begging [40]. Consider a population 236 
containing a Cooperator phenotype that donates meat to others at net cost to its own fitness, 237 
and a Defector phenotype that benefits from the donated meat without reciprocating. The 238 
meal-sharing process may be one of strong altruism by Cooperators or parasitic manipulation 239 
by Defectors. Strong altruism is only sustainable if population structure or other mechanisms 240 
of assortative mixing direct the benefits of altruism disproportionately to other altruists (or to 241 
kin). In contrast, manipulation by Defectors has no structural pre-requisite given a negative 242 
payoff for their same-strategy interactions (P < 0). Competition for mutually limiting 243 
resources presents a natural interpretation for P < 0, when Defectors depress each other’s 244 
reproductive success below the intrinsic success achievable in the absence of others. Thus in 245 
equation (4.2), P < 0 allows incursion into the Defector population by Cooperators that 246 
themselves suffer competition with the Defectors (S < 0), always provided S > P. Under these 247 
conditions, manipulative behaviour in an unstructured population once established may 248 
subsequently favour selection on food donors to suffer it only from other donors (or kin). The 249 
Cooperator phenotype then favours population structures that facilitate reciprocal (or kin-250 
selected) donation of fitness. The interaction is nevertheless incidental altruism driven by 251 
parasitism for as long as P < 0 sustains the net-cost transferral of fitness even without such 252 
population structures. Strong altruism cannot be the evolutionary driver of the +/– interaction 253 
itself, it can only drive selection for the assortative mixing that confers indirect benefits on 254 
donors through reciprocation (or kin beneficiaries). In effect, donors do not give benefit to 255 
others in order to receive it back reciprocally or via kin, the benefit is taken from them by 256 
others. To the extent that they are able, however, it makes sense for donors to limit the theft to 257 
reciprocators or kin, for example by limiting dispersal (a form of ‘social niche construction’ 258 
[41,42]). Similarly, intraspecific brood parasitism in birds can function as helping when the 259 
host is a relative [43]. Any net fitness cost to an individual in hosting a relative’s egg is 260 
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incidental altruism if the behaviour is sustained with no lower threshold for the indirect 261 
benefit to the host through relatedness. 262 
5. BETWEEN-POPULATION DYNAMICS OF EXPLOITATIVE GAMES 263 
The 1-dimensional system of equation (4.2) for a single population readily expands to 264 
accommodate two genetically isolated populations competing within and between their 265 
genotypes to exploit limiting resources. Standard Lotka-Volterra coupled rate equations 266 
describe the 2-dimensional population dynamics for a closed community: 267 
 1i i i ij j i in r n n n k        . (5.1)   
For each Genotype-i, rate in  describes continuous change over time in abundance ni, where ki 268 
is its carrying capacity in the absence of the other genotype. Population change is determined 269 
by the intrinsic rate of increase per capita ri, moderated by the density of both populations, 270 
with interaction coefficient αij measuring the impact on Genotype-i from Genotype-j relative 271 
to the normalized impact αii = -1 on Genotype-i from its own type. For example, Genotype-i 272 
takes αij < 0 if its population growth is impeded by competition from Genotype-j. The 273 
negative payoff to Genotype-i from the interaction then counts as a cost relative to intrinsic 274 
fitness ri before any interactions.  275 
In terms of a game, payoffs are measured relative to fitness ri available prior to playing 276 
the game. The calibration of payoffs is manifested explicitly by viewing a Lotka-Volterra 277 
model for G genotypes as an equivalent replicator model for G + 1 phenotypes [38]. 278 
Accordingly, the equation-(5.1) model for genotypes i = 1, 2 translates to replicator equation 279 
 i i ix x        A x x A x  for phenotypes i = 1 to 3 with x1 + x2 + x3 = 1, taking payoff matrix 280 
A: 281 
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2 1 12 1 2 1
21 2 1 1 2 2
0 0 0
k k r r r
r r k k r


  
   
 
  
A .  (5.2)   
The bottom row of A takes zeros, reflecting the absence of a third active strategy. A13 and A23 282 
are then payoffs to Cooperator and Defector respectively without interactions. 283 
Solving for ni in equation (5.1) at in = 0 gives its stable equilibrium population size: 284 
ni* = i ij jk n  , (5.3)   
Given nj* = kj when ni* = 0, solving for αij in equation (5.3) yields the necessary and 285 
sufficient condition for positive equilibrium abundance of Genotype-i (i.e., ni* > 0): 286 
αij > –ki /kj. (5.4)   
When both populations meet condition (5.4), equation (5.3) yields stable ni at system 287 
equilibrium: 288 
ni* =    1i ij j ij jik k      . (5.5)   
These predictions describe the equilibrium outcomes of ecological processes defined by 289 
equation (5.1) for a two-strategy game played by two populations. They have been thoroughly 290 
analysed in ecological theory [44-46], though not at all in game theory. 291 
Figure 2(d) shows how the α plane of interaction coefficients partitions into domains of 292 
equilibrium persistence for one or both genotypes on condition (5.4). The green domain 293 
encompasses stable equilibrium coexistence, with the populations growing monotonically, or 294 
in damped oscillations, to positive n1* and n2*. The white domain encompasses bi-stability. 295 
All four outcomes on the α plane have exactly corresponding outcomes on the Temptation-296 
Sucker plane of figure 2(c), with assignment of cross-strategy payoffs S = α12 and T = α21. The 297 
mutual payoffs R = -k2/k1 and P = -k1/k2 enumerate the greater efficiency of G1 relative to G2 298 
in costly resource exploitation. They are forcibly non-positive because the carrying capacities 299 
k1 and k2 take non-negative values. With the Cooperator genotype G1 having the greater 300 
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carrying capacity, figure 2(d) has -k2/k1 > -k1/k2 just as figure 2(c) has R > 1/R for 0 > R > -1 301 
and P = 1/R. 302 
The α-plane origin must lie within the coexistence domain, given negative R. Figure 2(d) 303 
shows its surrounding quartiles, which determine the identities of freely interacting 304 
genotypes. The four alternatives are +/+ mutualistic, +/– parasite-host, –/– competitors, and   305 
–/+ host-parasite [47]. Given the costly nature of same-genotype interactions, all cross-306 
genotype interactions involve forms of selfish exploitation, whether to mutual benefit or cost, 307 
or to the benefit of one at the cost of the other. Within the domain of coexistence, positive or 308 
negative αij for Genotype-i are expressed in larger or smaller ni* relative to ki, as determined 309 
by equation (5.5). Thus a genotype has parasitic status if it achieves higher equilibrium 310 
abundance in the presence of the other genotype than on its own, resulting from a transferral 311 
of fitness at net-cost to the other, which therefore has host status. For example, the dynamic of 312 
cuckoos parasitizing the nests of other bird species is sustained in the model by the surrogate 313 
parent genotype G1 having a sufficiently higher carrying capacity (k1 > k2) to compensate for 314 
its net cost in fitness (α12 < 0) from provisioning nestlings to the net benefit of the cuckoo 315 
chick (α21 > 0) with genotype G2. As a two-strategy game, the net-cost transferral of fitness 316 
from the surrogate parent to the net benefit of the cuckoo chick (T > 0 > S) is sustained by 317 
virtue of a sufficiently negative P to accommodate 0 > S > P in the SD domain. Whilst 318 
cuckoos are unmistakably parasitic, net-cost transferrals of fitness between symbiotic species 319 
can be sustained as altruism when indirect benefits accrue to relatives of the donor [48]. In 320 
such cases, a game-theoretic analysis of the sort illustrated in figure 2(d) can identify apparent 321 
or incidental altruism in which it is parasitism that drives the direct fitness benefits. 322 
In game-theoretic terms, the population dynamics of two resource-limited genotypes can 323 
only encompass all four games when the origin of the T-S plane is in the coexistence domain 324 
of SD (figures 2(c)-(d)). To locate the origin in SH or HG (as figures 2(a)-(b)) would mean 325 
C. P. Doncaster et al. 15 
 
that inter-genotype interactions are necessary to the persistence of one or both genotypes, 326 
which in turn would rule out the existence of SH and HG and/or PD games. For example, a 327 
predator G2 that depends on a prey G1 has standard Lotka-Volterra dynamics: 328 
 1 1 1 12 2 1 1 1 2 2 21 1 2 2 21 ,n c n n n d n n c n n d n              . (5.6)   
The impacts of predation are measured in a fitness cost α12 < 0 to each individual of the prey 329 
population n1, and a corresponding fitness benefit α21 > 0 to each individual of the predator 330 
population n2. The α-plane origin lies in the G1-only domain (equivalent to the T-S plane 331 
having its origin in HG), as a result of predator persistence requiring that α21 exceeds a 332 
positive threshold R (specifically, n* = 0 at R = d2/(c2k1) where k1 = 1 – d1/c1). Since G2 333 
cannot persist without G1, the α plane has no domains equivalent to the game-theoretic PD 334 
and SH (in effect, P  -). 335 
6. WHEN IS A NET-COST FITNESS TRANSFERRAL NOT STRONG ALTRUISM? 336 
The game-theoretic homology between victim or host responses to manipulation and strongly 337 
altruistic acts is not a trivial issue of re-labelling an altruist as victim. It speaks directly to 338 
questions about the evolutionary origins of cooperation, in ways that social game theory 339 
cannot when it confines itself to games with P ≥ 0, and therefore to already cooperative 340 
players. For example, a strain of bacterium G1 that manufactures a public good in the form of 341 
an extra-cellular polymeric biofilm may suffer its exploitation by a strain G2 that contributes 342 
nothing to the public good [49]. These types of interactions are commonly construed as forms 343 
of strong altruism requiring explanation in terms of population structure [25,50-51]. However, 344 
equations (5.1)-(5.5) predict stable coexistence of the two strains as +/– parasite-host in 345 
freely-mixing populations, provided G1 sufficiently compensates for its competitive 346 
inferiority with superior carrying capacity. A detailed physiological model of the growth in 347 
thickness of biofilms has predicted a potential competitive advantage to biofilm production in 348 
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sustaining access to oxygen, analogous to vertical growth in plants towards light [52]. Surface 349 
layers of biofilm suffocate deeper layers, in interactions between strains consistent with 350 
sustainable –/– competition or +/– parasitism in SD (figures 2(c)-(d)). Other acts of apparent 351 
altruism may also have testable alternative explanations in terms of exploitation. For example, 352 
plants that evolve to refrain from overshadowing their neighbours can be altruists [53]. An 353 
alternative driver in competitive exclusion should not be ruled out, however, unless the same-354 
strategy interaction amongst beneficiaries has a non-negative fitness payoff. 355 
Table 2 enumerates the full set of seven different social dilemmas and one HG that have 356 
cross-strategy interactions with a net-cost payoff to Cooperators and net-benefit payoff to 357 
Defectors. These include all combinations of game (PD, SD, HG, SH) with positive or 358 
negative R and P and +/– interactions between strategies, as stippled in figure 2. The three 359 
occurrences of outcomes in PD, and the two in SD, emphasize that the cross-strategy 360 
interactions in PD and SD are not synonymous with strong altruism and mutual benefit 361 
respectively, except in the restrictive case of P = 0. The many alternative outcomes of +/– 362 
interactions show that to assume non-negative same-strategy interactions (R > P ≥ 0), if 363 
inappropriate for the scenario at hand, will result in a host response to manipulation or 364 
parasitism in SD being mistaken for strong altruism in PD.  365 
Distinguishing between beneficial and costly same-strategy interactions requires 366 
measuring the fitness increment or decrement due to R or P above or below the intrinsic 367 
fitness available without interaction. For some eusocial insects or vertebrate societies in which 368 
lone individuals have low or zero survival, same-strategy interactions clearly bring benefits. 369 
In other cases, and particularly amongst microorganisms, it is not trivial to know whether 370 
same-strategy interactions are beneficial or costly relative to no interaction, because the 371 
reproductive success measurable in natural environments is usually that achieved in the 372 
presence of intra- and inter-specific interactions. To assume a non-negative P, however, can 373 
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lead to multiple misconceptions. These include wrongly identifying or predicting altruism, or 374 
wrongly interpreting the evolutionary driver of the net-cost transferral of fitness as kin-375 
selected or reciprocal altruism.  376 
7. DISCUSSION 377 
The mapping of replicator and Lotka-Volterra dynamics onto a common plane of payoffs for 378 
cross-strategy interactions has defined the conceptual difference between altruistic and 379 
parasitic interactions. We have shown how negative R and/or P are naturally conceived in 380 
ecological scenarios of a two-phenotype population and of independently self-replicating 381 
populations. They provide evolutionary game theory with an ecological framework for setting 382 
net-cost transferrals of fitness within the SD domain of stable coexistence. Moreover, they 383 
open ecological theory to game-theoretic analysis.  384 
Conventional game theory for social evolution assigns non-negative payoffs to same-385 
strategy interactions, which are then consistent with the convention to consider social 386 
behaviours as any interactions amongst same or cross strategies that have fitness 387 
consequences for actor and recipient [2]. In order to include competitive interactions within 388 
two-strategy games, we find it useful to consider a strategy as ‘social’ only if its same-389 
strategy interaction has a non-negative payoff, making it at least as good as no interaction. 390 
The alternative to a social strategy is then an ‘unsocial’ strategy defined by a costly same-391 
strategy interaction, making it an adverse encounter typical of mutual competition for limiting 392 
resource. Two-strategy games for two or more players assume that the game gets played, 393 
whether the players have elected or been forced to play it. Given the distinction between 394 
social and unsocial strategies, it makes sense to interpret a game as elected if both strategies 395 
are social. Then neither strategy incurs a cost by playing its own type, even if one or both may 396 
be susceptible to invasion by the other. Alternatively, a game is enforced if at least mutual 397 
defection has a negative payoff. Then at least the strategy of mutual defection incurs a cost by 398 
C. P. Doncaster et al. 18 
 
playing, as for example the impact of same-strategy competition on the intrinsic fitness prior 399 
to density effects. Enforcement is thus by an extrinsic process, such as competition for 400 
limiting resource. 401 
It has long been recognized that competition within population structures can reduce or 402 
cancel the net selective advantage of altruistic behaviour [8,14-17]. For kin structures, this 403 
balancing of effects depends on competition being coupled to relatedness [8, 15,54,55]. Our 404 
analysis is consistent with these results insofar as the strong altruism enacted by a Cooperator 405 
in a PD game requires a larger sacrifice in the presence of the costly same-strategy 406 
interactions typical of density-regulated competition (i.e., a more negative S in the PD 407 
domains of figures 2(b)-(d) than in figure 2(a)). The PD prediction of a Defector-only 408 
outcome applies to the case of homogenous competition and relatedness, and it is only the 409 
decoupling of relatedness from competition that can allow the Cooperator to direct altruism at 410 
kin. Crucially, however, the game theoretic representation of competition has shown how a 411 
victim of parasitic manipulation also functions as an incidental altruist if it allows itself to be 412 
victimized only by kin, in which case competition may motivate altruism via parasitic 413 
manipulation. This is a distinct mechanism from the policing of altruism by coercion, which is 414 
driven by altruists to enforce altruistic behaviours [4,56]. 415 
In the literature on the evolution of cooperation, the conventional application of game 416 
theory is to discrete phenotypes with replicator dynamics in elected games. Ecological 417 
contexts have involved building spatial structure into these dynamics. The addition of a third 418 
dynamic variable of empty space to the replicator equation causes its two-phenotype 419 
population to have lower density when Defectors predominate, which then favours the 420 
production of Cooperators in randomly forming discrete interaction groups [3,57]. Higher 421 
population densities resulting from the benefits of elected cooperation can promote spatial 422 
heterogeneity in the distribution of Cooperators when Defectors diffuse slowly [58,59]. All of 423 
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these models use a positive Reward. They consequently obtain Cooperator and Defector 424 
polymorphisms only with weak altruism in SD, or they depend on positive assortment of 425 
strategies to sustain net-cost fitness transferrals between social players in PD [20]. 426 
Investigations of social dilemmas stand to benefit from the application of game theory to 427 
competitive scenarios with negative R and/or negative P. 428 
8. CONCLUSIONS 429 
A net-cost transferral of fitness from strong altruist to beneficiary can be sustained without 430 
assortative mixing; the only component of altruism that requires assortative mixing is the 431 
indirect fitness gain that comes back to the donor as a result of its costly donation to kin or 432 
other altruists. This distinction leads to recognition of a new range of states that we call 433 
incidental altruism, in which parasitic exploitation by the beneficiary drives the direct fitness 434 
cost to the donor while selection on the donor for assortative mixing drives its indirect fitness 435 
gain from reciprocation or kin. Game-theoretic analyses have not previously considered this 436 
route to the evolution of cooperative behaviour, which is potentially widespread under 437 
density-dependent population regulation and has no lower threshold for assortative mixing. It 438 
further suggests the possibility that empirical studies interpreting net-cost transferrals of 439 
fitness as evidence of altruism may actually be seeing an interaction driven by parasitism 440 
(which we call ‘apparent altruism’, unless accompanied by assortative mixing as ‘incidental 441 
altruism’). Disaggregating the drivers for direct and indirect fitness consequences requires 442 
knowledge of the absolute payoff for the interactions amongst the donor’s beneficiaries. Only 443 
if this is non-negative is the net-cost transferral of fitness driven by altruism from the donor. 444 
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Table 1. Matrix of interaction payoffs for the actor in two-strategy games, assuming R > P. 569 
 570 
actor \ recipient Cooperator Defector 
Cooperator Reward, R Sucker, S 
Defector Temptation, T Penalty, P 
  571 
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Table 2. Specifications for the seven social dilemmas and one HG with net-cost transferrals of 572 
fitness from C Cooperators to D Defectors (the +/– interactions T > 0 > S, as stippled in figure 573 
2).  574 
 575 
 specification* game outcome players phenotypes populations 
(a) strong altruist to selfish beneficiary (R > P ≥ 0) 
1. T > R > P ≥ 0 > S PD D only figure 2(a) eqns (4.1), (4.2) - 
2. R ≥ T > 0, P ≥ 0 > S SH C or D figure 2(a) eqns (4.1), (4.2) - 
(b) apparent or incidental altruist victim to parasitic manipulation (R ≥ 0 > P) 
3. T > R ≥ 0 > P ≥ S PD D only figure 2(b) eqns (4.1), (4.2) - 
4. T > R ≥ 0 > S > P SD C and D figure 2(b) eqns (4.1), (4.2) eqn (5.6) 
5. R ≥ T ≥ 0 > S > P HG C only figure 2(b) eqns (4.1), (4.2) eqn (5.6) 
6. R ≥ T ≥ 0 > P ≥ S SH C or D figure 2(b) eqns (4.1), (4.2) - 
(c) apparent or incidental altruist victim to parasitic manipulation (0 > R > P) 
7. T ≥ 0 > R > P ≥ S PD D only figure 2(c) eqns (4.1), (4.2) eqn (5.1) 
8. T ≥ 0 > R > S > P SD C and D figure 2(c) eqns (4.1), (4.2) eqn (5.1) 
*Conditions are those in figure 1(a) of R > P and R > S for a social dilemma, which 576 
additionally requires 2R > T + S.  577 
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FIGURE LEGENDS 578 
 579 
Figure. 1. The four canonical games for two strategies on the continuous Temptation-Sucker 580 
plane (in gold and blue respectively), calibrated against constant values R > P. (a) Conditions 581 
on the table-1 payoff matrix for Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), Snow-Drift (SD), Harmony Game 582 
(HG), and Stag Hunt (SH). (b) Game outcomes for Cooperator and Defector strategies. 583 
 584 
Figure. 2. Game outcomes as figure 1(b), specifically setting P = ±1/R. Social dilemmas lie 585 
below the angled pink line denoting 2R > S + T, and T > R or P > S, given R > P; net-cost 586 
fitness transferrals from Cooperator to Defector occur in the stippled +/– quartile.  (a) SH 587 
takes the origin of the T-S plane (because R > P ≥ 0, here with P = 1/R and R = 5/3). (b) HG 588 
takes the origin of the T-S plane (R ≥ 0 > P, P = -1/R and R = 3/5).  (c) SD takes the origin of 589 
the T-S plane (0 > R > P, P = 1/R and R = -3/5).  (d) SD takes the origin of the α plane for 590 
competing genotypes G1 and G2 (k1 > k2 > 0, here with k2/k1 = 3/5). 591 
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